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INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 1 has been
considered one of the most important cases of modern administrative
law. 2 This seminal case marked the birth of the well-recognized
Chevron deference standard, which determines how far an agency
can go in interpreting the law.
Before the Supreme Court took up the issue in City of
Arlington v. FCC, 3 however, there was a longstanding dispute
regarding whether courts should apply Chevron deference when
reviewing an agency’s interpretation of their own so-called
“jurisdiction.”4 In other words, may administrative agencies receive
Chevron deference when interpreting the scope of their own
regulatory authority?
This note analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in City of
Arlington and discusses its impact upon the field of administrative
law. Part II outlines the history of Chevron deference and the
principles of administrative law at work in this case. Part III details
the facts, the background of the Communications Act of 1934—
Section 332(c)(7) in particular—and the procedural history of the
case.
Part IV presents and discusses the Court’s majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part V discusses the impact of
the City of Arlington decision on modern administrative law, and Part
VI concludes the note.

1

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
See Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); see also Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 512 (1989) (“Chevron has proven a highly important decision—perhaps
the most important in the field of administrative law since Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. NRDC.”). Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
3
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
4
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
2
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HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

A. The Law’s Development Prior to Chevron
Courts have long been called upon to determine when and
how much deference should be given to an administrative agency’s
interpretation of legislation that it is charged with administering. 5
Prior to its decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court applied diverse
deference standards to agency interpretations of regulations and had
failed to articulate a systematic doctrine. 6 As noted by George
Washington University Law Professor Richard Pierce, the preChevron judicial review of agency interpretations of statutes7 that the
agency implemented could be “characterized by pervasive
inconsistency and unpredictability.” 8
NLRB v. Hearst Publications9 represented one of the Supreme
Court’s first attempts at establishing guidelines for deference to
agency interpretations. In this case, publishers of four Los Angeles
daily newspapers refused to bargain collectively with a union
representing newsboys who distributed their papers on the streets of
that city. 10 The principal question that confronted the Court was
whether the newsboys were “employees” because Congress did not
explicitly define the term. 11 Reversing the Ninth Circuit, a fivejustice majority of the Court upheld the National Labor Relations
5

As early as 1810, in United States v. Vowell, the Supreme Court wrote, “If
the question had been doubtful, the court would have respected the uniform
construction which it is understood has been given by the treasury department of
the United States upon similar questions.” United States v. Vowell, 9 U.S. 368,
372 (1810).
6
See Russell L. Weaver & Thomas A. Schweitzer, Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Regulations: A Post-Chevron Assessment, 22 MEM. ST. U.L.
REV. 411, 413 (1992); see also Scalia, supra note 2, at 516 (“An ambiguity in a
statute committed to agency interpretation can be attributed to either of two
congressional desires: (1) Congress intended a particular result, but was not clear
about it; or (2) Congress had no particular intent on the subject, but meant to leave
its resolution to the agency. . . . As I read the history of developments in this field,
the pre-Chevron decisions sought to choose between (1) and (2) on a statute-bystatute basis.”).
7
This review differs in substance from the standard of review courts apply for
legislative pronouncements.
8
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 87 (Foundation Press 2008).
9
NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
10
Id. at 113.
11
Id. at 120.
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Board’s (NLRB) interpretation of the term and instructed reviewing
courts to defer to an agency’s construction of a statute that is
administered by the agency if it had “a reasonable basis in law.” 12
A few months earlier, however, a six-justice majority of the
Supreme Court, in the same term, decided Davies Warehouse Co. v.
Bowles and reached an opposite conclusion regarding deference. 13 In
Davies, the Court chose to ignore the agency’s interpretation of a
statutory term—“public utility”—which Congress had failed to
define.14 Even though the scope of the term was ambiguous and the
agency’s interpretation was sensible, the Court decided to follow its
own “reasonable view” instead of deferring to the agency
interpretation. 15
Later in the same year, the Supreme Court decided Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 16 which brought further confusion to the Court’s
jurisprudence on the deference issue. In Skidmore, the plaintiffs,
who were firemen, elevator operators, or relief firemen, orally agreed
that, in addition to their regular eight-hour duties, they would stay
overnight three and a half to four nights each week to answer fire
alarms. 17 During their time of employment, there were no fires and
few alarms.18 Under the labor administrator’s interpretations of the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the plaintiffs were not entitled to
recover overtime compensation for sleeping overnight on the
premises of the company,19 and thus the plaintiffs sued.20
Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Skidmore Court held that the
interpretations and opinions of the labor administrator were “entitled
to respect,” but were “not controlling upon the courts.”21 Writing for
the majority of the Court, Justice Jackson stated, “The weight
[accorded to an administrative] judgment in a particular case will
12

Id. at 131.
Davies Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 (1944).
14
Id. at 156.
15
Id. at 151–52, 156. Besides Davies, there were other cases where the Court
applied inconsistent standards regarding deference to agencies’ interpretations.
See, e.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 492 (1947) (holding that
the NLRB’s adjudicative opinions addressing whether company forepersons could
be classified as “employees” were not entitled to deference).
16
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
17
Id. at 135.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 136.
20
Id. at 135–36.
21
Id. at 140.
13
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depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control.” 22 One commentator noted
that Skidmore established a principle of “cautious deference” to
agency interpretations.23
Therefore, prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court’s
inconsistencies on the issue of agency interpretation weaved “a
pattern of wavering between strong and weak deference” that would
continue for over four decades. 24 The lack of clarity in the Court
rulings imposed many adverse effects on the parties who litigated the
matter. In the words of Justice Scalia, the pre-Chevron Court’s
“statute-by-statute evaluation” approach created “a font of
uncertainty and litigation.”25
B. The Establishment of Chevron Deference
In June 1984, the Supreme Court decided Chevron and issued
what many feel was the single most definitive instruction regarding
deference to administrative agencies’ interpretations of statutes.26 In
Chevron, an environmental advocacy group challenged an
Environment Protection Agency (EPA) interpretation of the term
“stationary source” as used in the Clean Air Act (CAA) Amendments
of 1977.27 The principal issue was whether the EPA’s ruling, which
allowed “[s]tates to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within
the same industrial grouping as though they were encased within a
single ‘bubble,’” was a reasonable interpretation of the statutory term
“stationary source.”28
22

Id.
Jamie A. Yavelberg, The Revival of Skidmore v. Swift: Judicial Deference
to Agency Interpretations After EEOC v. Aramco, 42 DUKE L.J. 166, 166 (1992).
24
Naaman A. Fiola, Christensen v. Harris County: Pumping Chevron for All
It’s Worth—Defining the Limits of Chevron Deference, 21 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN.
L. JUDGES 151, 154 (2001); see also John G. Osborn, Legal Philosophy and
Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 115, 116
(1999).
25
Scalia, supra note 2, at 516.
26
See sources cited supra note 2; see also sources cited infra note 41.
27
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 839–40
(1984).
28
Id. at 840.
23
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Through the amended CAA, Congress imposed certain
requirements on states that had not satisfied the national air quality
standards established by the EPA in accordance with earlier
legislation. 29 Those “nonattainment” states 30 were required to
establish a permit program regulating “new or modified major
stationary sources” of air pollution.31 Both prior to and following the
amendments, however, the CAA failed to define the term “stationary
source” for purposes of measuring pollutants. 32
The regulations the EPA promulgated in October 1981
allowed a state to adopt a plant-wide definition of the term
“stationary source” instead of classifying each of its pollutionemitting devices as individual stationary sources. 33
This
interpretation, which became known as the “bubble” theory, allowed
states to increase pollution in one area of their facility so long as
there was an equivalent decrease in another area.34
Taking into consideration that Congress did not define
“stationary source,” and this particular issue was not addressed in the
legislative history, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the EPA’s
interpretation of the term and upheld its policy. 35 In arriving at such
a conclusion, the Court adopted a two-prong test to determine
whether a reviewing court should defer to an agency’s construction
of a statute. 36 The two questions that reviewing courts need to
consider are:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of
Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at
issue, the court does not simply impose its own
29

Id. at 837.
“Nonattainment” states were those states that had not achieved the national
air quality standards established by the EPA. Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 841.
33
Id. at 837.
34
Id. at 837, 840.
35
Id. at 859–66.
36
Id. at 842–43.
30
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construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.37
By identifying a two-step analysis, the Supreme Court
established a new standard for reviewing how far an agency can go in
interpreting the law. 38 Chevron initiated a rather clear and unified
rule in determining the agency’s interpreting authority when the
statute under its administration is unclear or ambiguous. Reviewing
courts must presume that Congress has granted the agency authority
to fill in the gaps as long as the agency’s interpretation is not
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” 39 In
other words, the agency’s interpretation does not have to be the best
choice out there; instead it just needs to meet a low threshold of
“reasonableness” under the circumstances.
The impact of Chevron deference on the field of
administrative law is well-recognized and long-lasting.
One
commentator noted:
Since its publication, Chevron has been the controlling
case in the area of judicial deference to administrative
interpretations and rules. The decision has become
the basis for any evaluation of the allocation of
authority among administrative agencies, the federal
courts, and state courts.
Chevron essentially
proclaimed that when the plain words of a statute are
ambiguous, it is the sole province of the
administrative agency responsible for overseeing the
implementation of that statute to determine precisely
what the law says. 40

37

Id.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Chevron, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), marked the
birth of the well-known Chevron deference.
39
Id. at 844.
40
A. Michael Nolan, State Agency-Based v. Central Panel Jurisdictions: Is
There a Deference?, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 15 (2009).
38
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Therefore, Chevron represents a significant departure from the “caseby-case evaluation” approach adopted by pre-Chevron courts.41 For
instance, prior to Chevron, the Supreme Court ruled in Skidmore that
an agency’s rulings, interpretations and opinions were not necessarily
controlling. 42 Chevron makes it clear that reviewing courts are
required to defer to the agency’s interpretation when it is reasonable.
C. The Application of Chevron Deference
Chevron deference is based upon the notion that the agency to
which Congress has delegated authority to administer the law is
“often in the best position to interpret that scheme.”43 In reaching its
decision in Chevron, the Supreme Court relied upon “agency
accountability and agency expertise to justify judicial deference to
agency interpretations of regulations.” 44 Despite the clear principles
established in Chevron, in the post-Chevron era, the Court has not
applied Chevron deference to all agency interpretations of statutes.
1. Limitations on the Chevron Framework
As mentioned earlier, in Chevron, the Supreme Court
deferred to the EPA’s interpretation contained in CAA, a legislative
regulation. 45 Legislative rules are established through Congress’s
grant of power to agencies, which have the binding effects of
statutes. 46 These legislative rules are different from interpretive
41

See Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
YALE L.J. 969, 971 (1992) (“Chevron is widely understood to mark a significant
transformation in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of deference”); see also
Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452, 453–55 (1989) (concluding that the
establishment of Chevron deference “announced the end of judicial vacillation
between two principal interpretive models”).
42
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
43
Weaver & Schweitzer, supra note 6, at 419.
44
Jonathon T. Molot, The Judicial Perspective in the Administrative State:
Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference with the Judiciary’s Structural Role,
53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 100–01 (2000).
45
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 840
(1984).
46
Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 167–68; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretive Rules, 2 ADMIN. L. REV. 547
(2000).
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rules, which are made by agencies without Congress’s grant of
power.47 “An agency may issue [interpretive rules] in a variety of
formats, including manuals, policy statements, staff instructions,
opinion letters, audits, correspondence, guidelines, press releases, and
internal memoranda.”48
In addition to mandating deference to agency interpretations
of legislative rules, the Supreme Court has also at times given
Chevron deference to non-legislative rules. For instance, in Auer v.
Robbins, the Court granted deference to the Secretary of Labor’s
interpretation contained in the form of a legal brief. 49 Justice Scalia,
writing for a unanimous court, noted that this format did not, “in the
circumstances of this case, make it unworthy of deference.” 50 More
specifically, in Auer, police sergeants sued city board of police
commissioners under the FLSA for overtime wage benefits. 51 The
city board responded that the plaintiffs were not entitled to such pay
because of their exempt status.52 Under regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of Labor, one requirement for exempt status was that
the employee earned a specified minimum amount on a salary basis,
rather than an hourly rate. 53 The Court held that the Secretary’s
interpretation of the salary-based test was entitled to Chevron
deference because it was a permissible reading of its own
regulation.54
In contrast, in Christensen v. Harris County, the Supreme
Court ruled against the validity of an opinion letter when deciding
whether the letter, promulgated by the agency to interpret a
regulation, was entitled to Chevron deference. 55 In Christensen,
Harris County wrote to the Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour
Division, asking whether it could require its employees to schedule
time off in order to reduce the amount of accrued compensatory

47

Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 167–68.
Fiola, supra note 24, at 160; see also Yavelberg, supra note 23, at 168.
49
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997).
50
Id.
51
Id. at 455.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 462–63.
55
Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
48
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time.56 The Acting Administrator of the Division gave his reply to
the county’s inquiry in an opinion letter.57
Distinguishing Christensen from Auer, in which the Court
held that the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation contained
in a legal brief was entitled to deference,58 Justice Thomas noted in
his majority opinion:
Auer deference is warranted only when the language
of the regulation is ambiguous. The regulation in this
case, however, is not ambiguous—it is plainly
permissive. To defer to the agency’s position would
be to permit the agency, under the guise of
interpreting a regulation, to create de facto a new
regulation.59
Furthermore, regarding the application of Chevron deference to
informal agency interpretive formats such as interpretive rules or
opinion letters, the Court, providing some guidance to reviewing
courts, explained:
Here, however, we confront an interpretation
contained in an opinion letter, not one arrived at after,
for example, a formal adjudication or notice-andcomment rulemaking. Interpretations such as those in
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in
policy statements, agency manuals, and enforcement
guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not
warrant Chevron-style deference. 60
Shortly after Christensen, in United States v. Mead Corp.,
another important decision, the Supreme Court found the opportunity
again to carve out more exceptions to the application of Chevron
deference, further limiting an agency’s rulemaking power. 61 In

56

Id. at 580.
Id. at 580–81.
58
Id. at 588.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 587.
61
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
57
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Mead, the Mead Corporation (Mead) imported “day planners.” 62 In
January 1993, the United States Customs Service (Customs) issued a
ruling letter changing its classification of Mead’s day planners from
an “other” category to “[d]iaries . . ., bound” category, subject to
different tariff schedules. 63
The Mead Court thus confronted the issue concerning
whether a tariff classification change in the form of a ruling letter
was entitled to Chevron deference. 64 Taking into consideration the
limits of Chevron deference on agency interpretations, the Court
stated:
We hold that administrative implementation of a
particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated
authority to the agency generally to make rules
carrying the force of law, and that the agency
interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in
the exercise of that authority. Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or noticeand-comment rulemaking, or by some other indication
of a comparable congressional intent.65
Ruling letters, as the Court noted, “respond to transactions of
the moment . . . are not subject to notice and comment before being
issued, [and] may be published but need only be made ‘available for
public inspection.’”66 Thus the Court held that the Customs’ ruling
failed to qualify for Chevron deference because it fell far short of the
notice-and-comment process. 67 Yet where Chevron deference is
inapplicable, reasonable agency interpretations will be considered as
persuasive under the Court’s ruling in Skidmore.68 Furthermore, the
Court acknowledged that Customs could “bring the benefit of
specialized experience to bear on the subtle questions in this case.”69
62

Id. at 224.
Id. at 224–25.
64
Id. at 221.
65
Id. at 226–27.
66
Id. at 223 (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1625(a) (2000)).
67
Id. at 231.
68
Id. at 234–35.
69
Id. at 235.
63
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Finally, the Court noted that “[s]uch a ruling may surely claim the
merit of its writer’s thoroughness, logic, and expertness, its fit with
prior interpretations, and any other sources of weight.”70
Based on our analyses of the post-Chevron Court rulings in
Auer, Christensen, and Mead, we can conclude that Chevron
deference is applicable when the agency makes a formal
adjudication, when it follows rulemaking proceedings by providing
notice and an opportunity for individuals or groups to make
comments, or when it exercises some other comparable
implementations of law-making authority. On the other hand, where
Chevron deference is not applicable, the agency interpretations might
nevertheless be considered persuasive by reviewing courts under the
principles of “thoroughness,” “validity,” and “consistency”
established in Skidmore.71
2. The Controversy over “Chevron Step Zero”
The initial inquiry into whether the Chevron framework
applies at all has been referred to as “Chevron Step Zero.” 72 As
analyzed above, in Auer, Christensen, and Mead, the Supreme Court
considered whether Chevron deference applied to agencies’
interpretations depending on what types of procedures and actions
those agencies took. 73 In other words, the binding effect and
authoritativeness of a procedure was among the factors relevant to
whether a decision carried the force of law. 74 The real concern
behind the Court’s considerations focused upon whether Congress

70

Id.
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
72
Thomas W. Merrill and Kristin E. Hickman used the term “step zero” in
2001 in Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836 (2001) (“Together, these
principles comprise what might be called ‘step zero’ in the Chevron doctrine: the
inquiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron
framework at all, as opposed to the Skidmore framework or deciding the
interpretational issue de novo.”).
73
See also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (ruling that Chevron
deference does not apply to the Attorney General’s interpretation because there is
no general grant of rulemaking power to the Attorney General).
74
See Mary Holper, Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241,
1263–72 (2011).
71
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had made an implicit delegation of interpretive authority to an
agency. 75
The Court’s consideration of an agency’s choice of
procedures constitutes only one aspect of the “Chevron Step Zero”
inquiry. Another important aspect of the inquiry is whether Chevron
applies in the context of an agency’s determination of its own
statutory jurisdiction. Before the Court decided the issue in City of
Arlington, the circuit courts had adopted different approaches in
answering the question.76
Besides those circuits that decided not take a position,77 two
opposing views existed on the issue. More specifically, one group of
circuits had applied Chevron deference to disputes over the scope of
an agency’s jurisdiction.
In Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping
Authority v. Valley Freight Systems, Inc., for instance, the Third
Circuit held, “When Congress has not directly and unambiguously
addressed the precise question at issue, a court must accept the
interpretation set forth by the agency so long as it is a reasonable one
. . . . This rule of deference is fully applicable to an agency’s
interpretation of its own jurisdiction.” 78 Similarly, in Hydro
Resources, Inc. v. EPA, the Tenth Circuit concluded that courts
should “afford considerable deference to agencies interpreting
ambiguities in statutes that Congress has delegated to their care, . . .
including statutory ambiguities affecting the agency’s jurisdiction . . .
.”79
The other group of circuits refused to apply the Chevron
framework to an agency’s determination of its own statutory
75

See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 207–20
(naming the three cases Christensen, Mead, and Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212
(2002), a “Step Zero” trilogy where the Court attempted to sort out the applicability
of the Chevron framework).
76
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (noting that there was a circuit split on the issue); Pruidze v.
Holder, 632 F.3d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 2011) (observing that the question remained to
be resolved over whether Chevron applies to disputes concerning the agency’s
scope of jurisdiction).
77
See Pruidze, 632 F.3d at 237; see also O’Connell v. Shalala, 79 F.3d 170,
176 (1st Cir. 1996) (leaving the question open); City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 248
(“[S]ome circuits have thus far avoided taking a position.”).
78
P.R. Mar. Shipping Auth. v. Valley Freight Sys., Inc., 856 F.2d 546, 552 (3d
Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).
79
Hydro Res., Inc. v. EPA, 608 F.3d 1131, 1145–46 (10th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(citations omitted).
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jurisdiction. For example, in Bolton v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, the Federal Circuit reviewed an agency’s legal conclusion
regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction and did not apply Chevron
deference to the agency’s own determination. 80 In Northern Illinois
Steel Supply Co. v. Secretary of Labor, the Seventh Circuit reached a
similar conclusion, holding that courts should conduct de novo
review on an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of
jurisdiction.81
In view of such a circuit split, in City of Arlington, the Court
sought to resolve the disputes and determine whether a court should
apply Chevron deference to an agency’s interpretation of its
jurisdiction under a particular law when that interpretation is called
into question. This represented the Court’s further effort to resolve
the controversy over “Chevron Step Zero,” and to explore the
limitations and boundaries of Chevron deference concerning the
doctrine’s application. Whether questions regarding an agency’s
“jurisdiction” were somewhat special was the principal inquiry
underlying the Court’s opinion.
FACTS AND THE PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF CITY OF ARLINGTON

III.

A. Facts
1. The Wireless Association’s Petition to the FCC
On July 11, 2008, CTIA–The Wireless Association (CTIA),82
which represents wireless service providers, filed a petition
requesting that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
issue a Declaratory Ruling clarifying provisions in Section 332(c)(7)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended (Communications
Act), regarding state and local review of wireless facility siting

80
81

Bolton v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 154 F.3d 1313, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
N. Ill. Steel Supply Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 294 F.3d 844, 846–47 (7th Cir.

2002).
82

When the organization was founded in 1984, it was known as the Cellular
Telecommunications Industry Association. “In 2000, CTIA merged with the
Wireless Data Forum and became the Cellular Telecommunications & Internet
Association.” Amy Storey, Is CTIA an Acronym?, CTIA–WIRELESS ASS’N BLOG
(June 1, 2009), http://blog.ctia.org/2009/06/01/is-ctia-an-acronym/#.
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applications. 83 The petition alleged that ambiguities in the statute
had made it possible for local governments to obstruct the placement
and construction of wireless facilities, harming consumers’ access to
wireless services. 84
In particular, CTIA petitioned the FCC to clarify the meaning
of Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii)’s requirement that zoning authorities act
on siting requests “within a reasonable period of time,” and to
“provide guidance on what constitutes a ‘failure to act’ for purposes
of [Section] 332(c)(7)(B)(v).”85 The FCC was asked to specify “the
time periods within which a state or locality must act on wireless
facility siting applications.”86 Furthermore, CTIA suggested to the
FCC that a local government has failed to act if there is no final
action “within 45 days from the submission of a wireless facility
application and within 75 days from submission of other wireless
siting facility applications.”87
2. The Communications Act of 1934: Section 332(c)(7)
Wireless telecommunications networks need towers and
antennas; local zoning authorities are required to process and approve
siting facility applications for those towers and antennas. 88 In the
1996 Telecommunications Act, “Congress ‘impose[d] specific
limitations on the traditional authority of state and local governments
to regulate the location, construction, and modification of such
facilities,’” and amended the 1934 Communications Act by
incorporating those limitations and adding Section 332(c)(7). 89 In
addition, in Section 201(b) of the Communications Act, Congress
granted rule-making authority to the FCC; the agency can “prescribe
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest
to carry out [its] provisions.” 90 There is no dispute that the FCC’s

83

City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133
S. Ct. 1863 (2013).
84
Id. at 234.
85
Id. at 234–35; 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7) (2012).
86
City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 234–35.
87
Id.
88
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866 (2013).
89
Id. (citing Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 115 (2005)).
90
47 U.S.C. § 201(b); see also City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1866.
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power in administering the law extends to the subsequently added
provisions of the Communications Act.91
Section 332(c)(7) was added to the Communications Act for
the purpose of balancing two competing interests: on one hand,
Congress desires to “preserve the traditional role of state and local
governments in regulating land use and zoning”;92 on the other hand,
Congress is interested in promoting “the rapid development of new
telecommunications technologies by removing the ability of state and
local governments to impede the construction and modification of
wireless communications facilities through delay or irrational
decision-making.”93
Section 332(c)(7) of the Communications Act is titled
“Preservation of Local Zoning Authority,” which addresses “the
authority of a State or local government . . . over decisions regarding
placement, construction, and modification of personal wireless
service facilities.”94 Subsection (A) is known as the “saving clause,”
stating that nothing in the Communications Act limits such authority
except as provided in Section 332(c)(7).95 Subsection (B) identifies
five such limitations, and only one of them, Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii),
was at issue in City of Arlington. That provision mandates that state
or local governments act on wireless siting applications “within a
reasonable period of time after the request is duly filed.” 96 If the
state or local governments fail to act, Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v) permits
the applicant adversely affected to “commence an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction” within thirty days after failure to act.97

91

City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1866.
City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 234.
93
Id.; see also City of Rancho Palos Verdes, 544 U.S. at 115; T-Mobile, Cent.,
LLC v. Unified Gov’t of Wyandotte Cnty., 546 F.3d 1299, 1306 (10th Cir. 2008).
94
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
92
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B. Procedural History
1. The FCC’s Declaratory Ruling
After
receiving
CTIA’s
petition,
the
Wireless
98
(WTB) issued a public notice
Telecommunications Bureau
requesting comments. 99 It was reported that the FCC received
hundreds of comments from wireless service providers, local zoning
authorities, and other interested parties. 100 Industry commentators
supported the petition, arguing that the FCC had the power to
interpret Section 332(c)(7) and that the FCC’s clarification of the
reasonable time frames would promote the development of advanced
wireless networks. 101 In contrast, state and local governments
opposed the petition, contending that Congress gave the authority to
courts, not the FCC, to determine what was “a reasonable period of
time” and when a “failure to act” had occurred.102
In its declaratory ruling released on November 18, 2009, the
FCC agreed with the wireless providers, holding that it had the
authority to interpret Section 332(c)(7).103 The FCC identified four
statutory sources from which it received its jurisdiction power. 104
First, it contended that Section 1 of the Communications Act directed
the FCC to “execute and enforce the provisions of the Act” in order
to regulate the national wireless services. 105 Second, the FCC argued
that Section 201(b) of the Act delegated power to the FCC because
the agency could “prescribe such rules and regulations as may be
necessary in the public interest to carry out the provisions of this
Act.” 106 Third, the FCC relied upon Section 303(r) of the
Communications Act, which provides that “the [FCC] from time to
98

WTB is a division of FCC that “regulates domestic wireless
telecommunications programs and policies, including licensing.”
It also
“implements competitive bidding for spectrum auctions and regulates wireless
communication services.”
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION,
http://www.fcc.gov/bureaus-offices (last visited Jan. 4 2013).
99
24 FCC Rcd. 13994, 13997–98 (2009).
100
Id. at 13998.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id. at 14001.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001.
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time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires shall . . .
[m]ake such rules and regulations and prescribe such restrictions and
conditions, not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this Act.” 107 Finally, the FCC argued that
Congress granted authority to the agency in Section 4(i) of the
Communications Act, which states that the FCC “may perform any
and all acts, make such rules and regulations, and issue such orders,
not inconsistent with this [Act], as may be necessary in the execution
of its functions.”108
In addition to relying on these statutory grants of power, the
FCC also pointed out that the Sixth Circuit, in deciding Alliance for
Community Media v. FCC, 109 held that the FCC possessed “clear
jurisdiction authority to formulate rules and regulations interpreting
the contours of section 621(a)(1)” according to its authority under
Section 201(b) to administer the provisions of the Communications
Act. 110 Furthermore, the FCC highlighted the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning that “the statutory silence in section 621(a)(1) regarding
the agency’s rulemaking power does not divest the agency of its
express authority to prescribe rules interpreting that provision.” 111
Disagreeing with the state and local zoning authorities’
contention that the FCC’s interpretation imposed “new” limitations
on state and local governments, the FCC stated, “Our interpretation
of Section 332(c)(7) is not the imposition of new limitations, as it
merely interprets the limits Congress already imposed on State and
local governments.” 112 Moreover, the FCC insisted that Section
332(c)(7)(B)(v), the judicial review provision, did not by itself
prohibit the agency from interpreting the provisions of the
Communications Act.113
Dissatisfied with the FCC’s ruling, several interested
governmental entities filed another petition to the FCC for
reconsideration, requesting the agency to stay its ruling pending
review and any judicial appeals. 114 In its Reconsideration Order
107

47 U.S.C. § 303(r); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001.
47 U.S.C. § 154(i); see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14001.
109
Alliance for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2008).
110
Id. at 773–74; see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14002.
111
Alliance for Cmty. Media, 529 F.3d at 774; see also 24 FCC Rcd. at 14002.
112
24 FCC Rcd. at 14002.
113
Id. at 14002–03.
114
City of Arlington v. FCC, 668 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012), aff’d, 133 S.
Ct. 1863 (2013).
108
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released on January 29, 2010, the FCC denied the stay request and
reaffirmed its declaratory ruling.115
2. The Fifth Circuit’s Ruling
Before the Reconsideration Order was issued, the cities of
Arlington and San Antonio, Texas, filed a petition in the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review of the FCC’s declaratory
ruling.116 In response to the cities’ contention that the FCC violated
the Administrative Procedure Act’s 117 (APA) notice-and-comment
requirements for rulemaking, the Fifth Circuit sided with the FCC,
holding that the agency’s declaratory ruling was the product of
adjudication, not rulemaking.118 Despite the fact that “agencies enjoy
broad discretion in choosing whether to establish a rule through
adjudication or rulemaking,” the Fifth Circuit emphasized that the
APA still requires courts to review agencies’ actions to determine
whether they are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” 119 After reviewing the
records, the Fifth Circuit concluded that “any error in the FCC’s
choice to establish the time frames in the Declaratory Ruling instead
of through notice-and-comment rulemaking was plainly harmless”
because the cities received notice of the issues and more than sixty
governmental entities had the opportunity to submit their
comments.120
Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the Chevron
two-step standard of review applies only when an agency’s
interpretation of a statute is made within its jurisdiction; otherwise
Chevron deference does not apply. 121 The principal issue presented
to the Fifth Circuit, therefore, was whether Chevron deference
applied in determining the scope of the FCC’s statutory authority
where the agency had been charged by Congress to administer
115

25 FCC Rcd. 1215, 1217–18 (2010).
City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 236.
117
For details on the APA, see 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012), available at
http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/laws/administrative-procedure/553.html
(last visited Jan. 5, 2014).
118
City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 239–41.
119
Id. at 241; see also Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 202 F.3d 788,
797 (5th Cir. 2000); 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
120
City of Arlington, 668 F.3d at 245.
121
Id. at 247–48.
116
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Subsections 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and (v), and it had decided to adopt the
90- and 150-day time frames.122 The FCC insisted that “an agency’s
interpretation of its own statutory authority is subject to review under
Chevron.”123 The cities, on the other hand, contended that the court
should conduct a de novo review because the issue presented a “a
pre-Chevron question of law.”124
The Fifth Circuit was well aware of the circuit split on the
issue, and eventually sided with those sister circuits that decided to
apply the Chevron two-step standard of review to an agency’s
interpretation of its own statutory jurisdiction. 125 Therefore, in
determining whether the FCC possessed the authority to establish the
time frames, the Fifth Circuit first considered whether Congress had
“directly spoken in a manner that reveal[ed] its expressed intent.”126
After analyzing the statute, the court concluded that Congress was
silent regarding Section 332(c)(7)(A)’s effect on the FCC’s power to
implement the limitations in Section 332(c)(7)(B).127 Furthermore,
the Fifth Circuit reasoned that Section 332(c)(7)(B)(v), the courts’
jurisdiction review provision, did not resolve the ambiguity. 128
After its determination of Chevron step-one, the Fifth Circuit
proceeded to a Chevron step-two analysis where courts must defer to
an agency’s interpretation if it is a reasonable construction of the
law.129 The Fifth Circuit found the cities’ arguments unconvincing
that Section 332(c)(7)’s legislative history contradicted the FCC’s
reading of the statute, that the FCC’s interpretation of Section
332(c)(7)(B)’s limitations preempted a power traditionally exercised
by state and local governments, and that the FCC’s exercise of
authority conflicted with “the FCC’s own longstanding interpretation
of its jurisdiction.”130 In conclusion, the Fifth Circuit held that courts
must defer to the FCC’s interpretation regarding the agency’s
exercise of authority in interpreting Subsections 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) and
(v).131
122

Id.
Id. at 248.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 248–49.
127
Id. at 252.
128
Id. at 250–52.
129
Id. at 252.
130
Id. at 252–54.
131
Id. at 254.
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On October 5, 2012, the Supreme Court granted the cities’
petition for writ of certiorari as to the first question presented:
“Whether, contrary to the decisions of at least two other circuits, and
in light of this Court’s guidance, a court should apply Chevron to
review an agency’s determination of its own jurisdiction.” 132 The
case was argued on January 16, 2013, and on May 20, 2013, the
Court delivered a divided opinion.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT’S OPINION
A. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion

Justice Scalia delivered the Court’s opinion, 133 which
affirmed the Fifth Circuit’s decision, holding that courts must defer
under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity
that concerns the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction. 134 Accordingly,
Chevron deference applied to the FCC’s declaratory ruling regarding
the scope of its jurisdictional power.135
Justice Scalia began his majority opinion by highlighting the
canonical formulation of the Chevron framework in a court’s review
of an agency’s construction of the statute that it is charged to
administer.136 He pointed out that the background presumption that
Chevron deference relies upon is congressional intent. 137 When
Congress left a statute ambiguous, Justice Scalia explained that it
“understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost,
by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to
possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.” 138
Thus, for the majority, Chevron constituted a stable rule where
132

See City of Arlington, Tx v. FCC, OYEZ, http://www.oyez.org/cases/20102019/2012/2012_11_1545 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014). Brief for Petitioner, at i,
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (No. 11–1545), 2012 WL
2516693. A total of one hour was allotted for oral argument, which took place on
January 16, 2013.
133
Justices Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s
majority opinion.
134
City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1866–75 (2013).
135
Id.
136
Id. at 1868.
137
Id.
138
Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41
(1996)).
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“[s]tatutory ambiguities [would] be resolved, within the bounds of
reasonable interpretation, not by the courts, but by the administering
agency.”139
1. False Dichotomy Between “Jurisdictional” and
“Nonjurisdictional” Interpretations
Justice Scalia stated that the so-called Chevron “step-zero”
question regarding whether Chevron deference applied to an
agency’s interpretation of its scope of authority rested on the premise
that there existed two distinct classes of agency interpretations. In
his words, “Some interpretations—the big, important ones,
presumably—define the agency’s ‘jurisdiction’” whereas “[o]thers—
humdrum, run-of-the-mill stuff—are simply applications of
jurisdiction the agency plainly has.” 140
Declaring the falsity of this premise, Justice Scalia
emphasized that there was no meaningful distinction between
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, and any
distinction would merely be “a mirage.” 141 Interestingly, even
though the Court granted writ of certiorari to consider whether
Chevron deference applied to an agency’s “jurisdictional”
interpretation, the majority refused to recognize the existence of any
meaningful category of “jurisdictional” questions. As Justice Scalia
concluded, “No matter how it is framed, the question a court faces
when confronted with an agency’s interpretation of a statute it
administers is always, simply, whether the agency has stayed within
the bounds of its statutory authority.”142
The majority contemplated that the misconception about the
distinction between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional”
interpretations derived “from a reflexive extension to agencies of the
very real division between the jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional
that is applicable to courts.” 143 Whereas there is a meaningful
distinction in the judicial context, Justice Scalia stated, “That is not
so for agencies charged with administering congressional statutes.”144
139

Id.; see also AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999).
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1868.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 1869.
140
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The explanation for the difference is that Congress not only delegates
powers to the agencies but also prescribes rules on how they are to
act.145 Therefore when agencies “act improperly, no less than when
they act beyond their jurisdiction, what they do is ultra vires.” 146
2. Dangers of Labeling Interpretations “Jurisdictional”
The majority used a hypothetical statute, the “Common
Carrier Act,” to illustrate the impossibility of, or rather the
meaninglessness in, separating jurisdictional interpretations from
nonjurisdictional interpretations. 147 The danger of labeling an
145

Id.
Id.
147
See id. at 1869–70. Justice Scalia gave two formulations of the imaginary
statute “Common Carrier Act.” Id. In the first version, the Act contains only one
section: “The Agency shall have jurisdiction to prohibit any common carrier from
imposing an unreasonable condition upon access to its facilities.” Id. at 1869.
Justice Scalia noted that the terms “common carrier” and “unreasonable condition”
both define the Agency’s jurisdiction. Id. Under the petitioner’s proposition,
courts must apply the de novo standard of review to determine the scope of that
jurisdiction. Id.
In the second version, Justice Scalia formulated the Act slightly differently:
146

SECTION 1. No common carrier shall impose an unreasonable
condition upon access to its facilities.
SECTION 2. The Agency may prescribe rules and regulations
necessary in the public interest to effectuate Section 1 of this Act.
Id.
According to Justice Scalia, since Congress makes it clear that the agency has
such power to interpret the statute for implementation, Chevron deference applies
under the petitioner’s theory and courts must defer to the Agency’s interpretation of
the terms “common carrier” and “unreasonable condition.
Id.
Through such a comparison, Justice Scalia questioned the soundness of the
petitioner’s argument. Id. at 1869–70. He wrote:
In the first case, by contrast, petitioner’s theory would
accord the agency no deference. The trouble with this is that in
both cases, the underlying question is exactly the same: Does the
statute give the agency authority to regulate Internet Service
Providers and cap prices, or not? The reality, laid bare, is that
there is no difference, insofar as the validity of agency action is
concerned, between an agency’s exceeding the scope of its
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agency’s interpretation “jurisdictional,” cautioned Justice Scalia, was
that it would become “an empty distraction” as “every new
application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a
questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction.” 148 Furthermore,
Justice Scalia warned that it would be a waste of time for judges to
do the “mental acrobatics” in making distinctions between
jurisdictional and nonjurisdicitonal questions in order to decide
whether Chevron deference applies.149
The majority went back to the case law, identifying a number
of examples in the Court’s jurisprudence to further support and
strengthen its position. 150 By creating a false dichotomy between
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” agency interpretations,151 the
Court cautioned that the ultimate target was Chevron itself. 152 In
Justice Scalia’s words, “Like the Hound of the Baskervilles, it [was]
conjured by those with greater quarry in sight.”153 The consequence
would be a transfer of “any number of interpretive decisions—
archetypal Chevron questions” from the agencies that implement the
authority (its “jurisdiction”) and its exceeding authorized
application of authority that it questionably has.
Id.
148

Id. at 1870. One of the briefs supporting the petitioners explained that
“[j]urisdictional questions concern the who, what, where, and when of regulatory
power: which subject matters may an agency regulate and under what conditions.”
See id. Justice Scalia noted that all of these so-called “jurisdictional” questions can
be “reframed as questions about the scope of the agencies’ regulatory
jurisdiction—and they are all questions to which the Chevron framework applies.”
Id.
149
Id.
150
See id. at 1871–72. The cases that Justice Scalia listed include United
States v. Eurodif S.A., 555 U.S. 305 (2009), FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco
Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000), Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,
478 U.S. 833 (1986), Chemical Manufacturers Ass’n. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116 (1985), and NLRB v. City Disposal Systems,
Inc., 465 U.S. 822 (1984).
151
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1872 (“The false dichotomy between
‘jurisdictional’ and ‘nonjurisdictional’ agency interpretations may be no more than
a bogeyman, but it is dangerous all the same.”).
152
Id. at 1872–73.
153
Id. (“Savvy challengers of agency action would play the ‘jurisdictional’
card in every case. . . . Some judges would be deceived by the specious, but scarysounding, ‘jurisdictional’-‘nonjurisdictional’ line; others tempted by the prospect of
making public policy by prescribing the meaning of ambiguous statutory
commands.”).
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statutes to federal courts regarding “how best to construe an
ambiguous term in light of competing policy interests.” 154 Justice
Scalia thus warned that judges should not take away the rule-making
power that belonged to the agencies, a constitutional concern that the
Chevron framework intended to address.155
3. Response to Federalism and Agency Power
Rejecting the cities’ contention that the FCC asserted
jurisdiction over matters of traditional state and local concern, Justice
Scalia stated, “this case has nothing to do with federalism.” 156
Section 332(c)(7)(B)(ii) of the Communications Act, as observed by
Justice Scalia, required the local zoning authorities to make decisions
about siting applications “within a reasonable period of time,” which
served as proof that the ambiguity in the statute was “indisputably a
question of federal law.” 157 Again, the majority warned that the
federalism argument was mainly used as a disguise and the real target
was Chevron deference. 158
In response to the dissenting opinion, the majority stated that
the dissent neither put up any defense for the “jurisdictionalnonjurisdictional” line 159 nor identified any case where “a general
conferral of rulemaking or adjudicative authority has been held
insufficient to support Chevron deference for an exercise of that
authority within the agency’s substantive field.” 160 The majority

154

Id. at 1873.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Justice Scalia wrote, “We rejected a similar faux-federalism argument in the
Iowa Utilities Board case, in terms that apply equally here: ‘This is, at bottom, a
debate not about whether the States will be allowed to do their own thing, but about
whether it will be the FCC or the federal courts that draw the lines to which they
must hew.’” Id.; see also AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397
(1999).
159
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873–74 (“Perhaps sensing the incoherence
of the ‘jurisdictional-nonjurisdictional’ line, the dissent does not even attempt to
defend it . . . but proposes a much broader scope for de novo judicial review.”).
160
Id. at 1874. The dissent identified Mead to support its preposition that “for
Chevron deference to apply, the agency must have received congressional authority
to determine the particular matter at issue in the particular manner adopted.” Id.
Justice Scalia stated that he did not dispute that, but he emphasized, “Mead denied
155
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rejected the dissent’s view that, before applying Chevron deference,
courts must conduct a de novo review on each particular issue even
when the agency’s general rulemaking power is clear. 161 The
consequence of this rule, Justice Scalia warned, was that it would
“render the binding effect of agency rules unpredictable and destroy
the whole stabilizing purpose of Chevron.”162 Finally, the majority
was unconvinced that applying Chevron to jurisdictional
interpretations would “[leave] the fox in charge of the henhouse,”
because such a distinction does not exist, and Chevron deference is
sufficient to ensure that an agency does not exceed its power when
interpreting ambiguous terms contained in the statute.163
B. Justice Breyer’s Concurring Opinion
Justice Breyer agreed with the majority of the Court that there
is no meaningful distinction between jurisdictional and
nonjurisdictional interpretations and the question that courts normally
confront, which is “simply, whether the agency has stayed within the
bounds of its statutory authority.”164 He cautioned, however, that it
is not always easy to decide the statutory bounds under the Chevron
framework.165 He further emphasized that “the existence of statutory
ambiguity is sometimes not enough to warrant the conclusion that
Congress has left a deference-warranting gap for the agency to fill”
because “other, and sometimes context-specific, factors” can affect
the application of Chevron.166

Chevron deference to action, by an agency with rulemaking authority, that was not
rulemaking.” Id.
161
Id.
162
Id. (“The excessive agency power that the dissent fears would be replaced
by chaos. There is no need to wade into these murky waters.”).
163
Id. (“The fox-in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by
establishing an arbitrary and undefinable category of agency decisionmaking that is
accorded no deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all
cases, statutory limits on agencies’ authority.”).
164
Id. at 1875 (Breyer, J., concurring).
165
Id.
166
Id. The relevant factors that Justice Breyer identified include “[t]he subject
matter of the relevant provision,” “the statute’s text, its context, the structure of the
statutory scheme, and canons of textual construction,” and “[s]tatutory purposes,
including those revealed in part by legislative and regulatory history.” Id. at 1875–
76.
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After considering a variety of factors in City of Arlington,
Justice Breyer was satisfied with the application of the Chevron
formula to the FCC’s interpretation, affirming that Chevron was “a
workable way to approximate how Congress would likely have
meant to allocate interpretive law-determining authority between
reviewing court and agency.” 167 Rejecting the cities’ arguments
about the “saving clause” and the “judicial review provision,” Justice
Breyer concurred with the majority to rule in favor of the FCC,
which, he declared, had the authority under the circumstances to fill
the gap left by Congress through the application of Chevron
deference. 168
C. Chief Justice Roberts’s Dissenting Opinion
Joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, Chief Justice Roberts
delivered the dissenting opinion, declaring at the very beginning that
“[m]y disagreement with the Court is fundamental.”169 Refusing to
apply Chevron deference to the “jurisdictional” question, the dissent
stated that a court must determine for itself that Congress has
delegated power to an agency before the agency can issue any
interpretations with the force of law. 170 In its City of Arlington
ruling, although the Fifth Circuit “correctly recognized that it could
not apply Chevron deference to the FCC’s interpretation unless the
agency ‘possessed statutory authority to administer Section
332(c)(7)(B)(ii),’” the dissent concluded that the Fifth Circuit
decided incorrectly by granting Chevron deference to the FCC’s view
on the “jurisdictional” question. 171
The dissent was deeply concerned about the growing power
possessed by administrative agencies.172 Even though these agencies
belong to the executive branch, in practice they exercise all three
powers: legislative, executive, and judicial. 173 Furthermore, federal
167

Id. at 1876.
Id. at 1876–77.
169
Id. at 1877 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
170
Id. at 1877–86.
171
Id. at 1886.
172
Id. at 1877–80.
173
Id. at 1877–78 (“Although modern administrative agencies fit most
comfortably within the Executive Branch, as a practical matter they exercise
legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of law; executive
power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial power, by
168
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bureaucracy continues to expand and more new agencies have been
created in recent years. 174 “[W]ith hundreds of federal agencies
poking into every nook and cranny of daily life,” Chief Justice
Roberts warned that presidential oversight would not always be an
effective safeguard against the abuse of power by agencies. 175 In
particular, Chief Justice Roberts noted that the FCC is “routinely
described as the ‘headless fourth branch of government.’”176
Even though judicial oversight serves as another check on the
power of administrative agencies, the dissent maintained that
agencies enjoy broad power under Chevron deference to interpret
ambiguous statutes over which Congress has delegated authority.177
“It is against this background that we consider whether the authority
of administrative agencies should be augmented even further,” Chief
Justice Roberts stated, “to include not only broad power to give
definitive answers to questions left to them by Congress, but also the
same power to decide when Congress has given them that power.”178
The dissent disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that there
was no meaningful distinction between “jurisdictional” and
“nonjurisdictional” interpretations. 179 According to Chief Justice
Roberts, the majority made its ruling based on the wrong argument:
The parties, amici, and court below too often use the
term “jurisdiction” imprecisely, which leads the Court
to misunderstand the argument it must confront. That
argument is not that “there exist two distinct classes of
agency interpretations,” some “big, important ones”
that “define the agency’s ‘jurisdiction,’” and other
“humdrum, run-of-the-mill” ones that “are simply
applications of jurisdiction the agency plainly has.”
The argument is instead that a court should not defer
to an agency on whether Congress has granted the

adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those found to have
violated their rules.”).
174
Id. at 1878.
175
Id. at 1878–79.
176
Id. at 1878.
177
Id. at 1878–79.
178
Id. at 1879.
179
Id.
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agency interpretive authority over the statutory
ambiguity at issue.180
Whether or not it is called a “jurisdictional” question, the dissent
emphasized that it is the duty of the judiciary department to say what
the law is.181 Before a court can apply the Chevron two-step analysis
and defer to an agency’s interpretation when it is a permissible
construction of the statute, the court must decide de novo whether the
agency possesses the authority to interpret the ambiguity at issue.182
The dissent insisted that Congress’s delegation of general
rule-making power to an agency is not sufficient to prove that the
agency has power to interpret a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. 183 Relying on a number of decisions in the Court’s
jurisprudence, 184 the dissent emphasized that “[w]e have never
faltered in our understanding of this straightforward principle, that
whether a particular agency interpretation warrants Chevron
deference turns on the court’s determination whether Congress has
delegated to the agency the authority to interpret the statutory
ambiguity at issue.”185 Thus the dissent rejected the FCC’s argument
that it could exercise authority over the particular ambiguity at issue
because Congress had delegated general power to the agency to
administer the Communications Act.186
The dissent criticized the majority’s approach of line-drawing
between “jurisdictional” interpretation and “nonjurisdictional”
interpretation. 187 It noted that the type of “jurisdictional” question
that the dissent emphasized would not be as difficult to distinguish as
the type of “jurisdictional” question that the majority had
identified. 188 To further expose the weaknesses of the majority’s
180

Id. at 1879–80.
Id. at 1880.
182
Id.
183
Id. at 1880–81.
184
Id. at 1880–83. The cases that Chief Justice Roberts listed include Adams
Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638 (1990), United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S.
218 (2001), and Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
185
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1881.
186
Id. at 1883–84.
187
Id. at 1884 (“As the preceding analysis makes clear, I do not understand
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scary-sounding’ line between ‘big, important’ interpretations on the one hand and
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reasoning, the dissent reused the majority’s hypothetical “Common
Carrier Act” to illustrate its point.189 No matter how the “Common
Carrier Act” is drafted, according to the dissent, courts always need
to inquire “whether Congress has delegated to the agency authority to
interpret the ambiguous terms, before affording the agency’s
interpretation Chevron deference.”190
Furthermore, the dissent rejected the majority’s concern and
warning about the potential destabilization of the Chevron doctrine if
courts are mandated to decide de novo the “jurisdiction” question
regarding an agency’s scope of power. 191 The dissent maintained
that courts have never deferred and should never defer to agencies
regarding whether Congress has authorized an agency to interpret the
ambiguity in the statute.192
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority’s view that it is “a
judicial power-grab” if courts decide on their own whether an agency
possesses the authority to interpret ambiguous terms, as those
interpretations often carry the force of law. 193 Even though the
majority’s opinion “touches on a legitimate concern” under the
constitutional structure of separation of powers, the dissent reminded
the majority that “there is another concern at play, no less firmly
rooted in our constitutional structure. That is the obligation of the
Judiciary not only to confine itself to its proper role, but to ensure
that the other branches do so as well.” 194 In addition, the dissent
emphasized, “Our [the judiciary’s] duty to police the boundary
between the Legislature and the Executive is as critical as our duty to
respect that between the Judiciary and the Executive.”195
In conclusion, City of Arlington has resolved, at least for now,
the principal issue regarding the applicability of Chevron deference
to an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of authority.
Interestingly, despite Justice Scalia’s strong “anti-federalism
bluster”196 in his majority opinion that “this case has nothing to do

189

See id. at 1885.
Id.
191
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with federalism,”197 the dissent was silent on the issue and did not
make any responses in its opinion. 198 As one commentator asked,
“Were Justice Kennedy’s clerks asleep? Or did [the Justices] simply
dismiss [the bluster] as dicta . . . ?”199 The dissent’s “silence” on
federalism is certainly a “mystery” left to everyone’s speculation.
V.

IMPACT OF THE COURT’S DECISION

A. The Judiciary’s Review of Administrative Agencies’ Rulemaking
Power
The majority and the dissent were arguing from two different
angles about the appropriate power division between the judiciary
and the executive when it comes to agencies’ interpretations of
ambiguous terms of statutes as enacted by the legislative branch. It
seems to be equally true, however, that they both were concerned
about maintaining the stability of the constitutional structure and
charting out the proper boundaries for the three separate yet
overlapping powers.
Marbury v. Madison established that it is “emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is.” 200 The reason that the executive branch is not allowed to
interpret statutory ambiguities is because “foxes are not permitted to
guard henhouses”; that is to say, “those who are limited by law
cannot decide on the scope of the limitation.”201 Enacted in 1946, the
APA is the basic charter that governs administrative agencies. 202 To
limit agencies’ rule-making power, the APA provides that “the
reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of law, [and]
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.” 203 Despite these
governing principles, there were important contrary indications in the
AM),
http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2013/05/scalias-odd-view-offederalism-in-city-of-arlington-v-fcc.html.
197
City of Arlington, 133 S. Ct. at 1873 (majority opinion).
198
See id. at 1877–86 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
199
Hills, supra note 196.
200
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
201
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the
Law Is, 115 YALE L. J. 2580, 2584 (2006).
202
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–557, 701–706 (2000); see also Sunstein, supra note
201, at 2585.
203
5 U.S.C. § 706.
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Court’s jurisprudence before Chevron where courts suggested that
agency interpretations would be upheld if they were made on rational
bases.204
The Chevron two-step inquiry that the Supreme Court
established almost two decades ago officially acknowledged and
confirmed the agencies’ rule-making power, which mandates the
reviewing court to defer to an agency’s interpretation of statutory
ambiguities if it is reasonable. 205 Yet in Chevron, as one
commentator noted, the Court did not discuss Marbury or the
governing provisions of APA; instead it put forward two “pragmatic”
arguments: “judges lack expertise,” and “they are not politically
accountable.” 206
More specifically, according to the Court,
interpreting statutory ambiguities calls for technical expertise and
political accountability, and therefore agencies have “conspicuous”
advantages compared to courts. 207 Furthermore, agencies can act
more promptly and effectively to adapt statutes than courts, as courts
are relatively decentralized and the judicial processes are
considerably more cumbersome.208
Therefore, even though Marbury holds that it is up to the
judicial department to say what the law is, the Court has legitimated
the executive’s rule-making power in Chevron regarding its
interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms.
Borrowing one
scholar’s words, this “reflects a salutary appreciation of the fact that
the law’s meaning is not a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky.’”209
In other words, “the executive, with its comparative expertise and
accountability, is in the best position to make the judgments of policy
and principle on which resolution of statutory ambiguities often
depends.”210
The dispute in City of Arlington was over whether courts
should defer under Chevron to an agency’s interpretation of its own
204

See Sunstein, supra note 201, at 2585; see also Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980); Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488
(1979); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 412
(1941).
205
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984).
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scope of authority. 211 Essentially it was a “Chevron Step Zero” issue,
which was distinct from the issue in Chevron where the dispute was
over the agency’s interpretation of a statutory ambiguity when the
agency was acting within its jurisdictional power. 212 Deciding in
favor of applying Chevron deference to the “Step Zero” inquiry
regarding an agency’s determination of its own scope of jurisdiction,
the majority in City of Arlington followed the same path of reasoning
in Chevron and further expanded agencies’ rule-making power. As
one commentator analyzed:
For the majority, as dangerous as giving agencies
broad interpretive power under Chevron may be, it is
better than giving judges leeway to pick and choose
when to defer to agencies and when not to. Judges are
even less politically accountable than are agencies,
and more prone to generating disuniform
interpretations of statutes based on ad hoc judgments.
According to the majority: “The excessive agency
power that the dissent fears would [absent a strong
Chevron deference doctrine] be replaced by chaos.”213
The decision in City of Arlington has the long-term effect of
further strengthening and expanding the executive’s rule-making
power, as courts are now required to give deference to an agency’s
determination of its own scope of jurisdiction. Concluding that
courts should defer to both “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional”
interpretations made by agencies that administer the ambiguous
statutes, the majority maintained that “judges ought to refrain from
substituting their own interstitial lawmaking for that of an agency.”214
By declaring that there are no meaningful distinctions between
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, the majority
211
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refused to create any additional limitations on the applicability of the
Chevron framework. 215 For the majority, the Chevron two-step
inquiry is a sufficient protection device that can prevent agencies
from acting irrationally or abusing the powers delegated to them by
Congress. 216
Although it acknowledged the legitimate and canonical status
of Chevron deference, the dissent disagreed with the majority that the
doctrine should be further expanded to include an agency’s
interpretation of its own scope of authority. 217 Rather, the Court
should have continued the route that it took in Christensen and Mead
to put further limitations on the applicability of the Chevron
framework, and particularly, to instruct courts to conduct a de novo
review when there are disputes over an agency’s interpretation of
“Step Zero” jurisdictional questions.218
Citing Marbury and the language and history of the APA,
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Judiciary should perform
its duty to “police the boundary between the Legislature and the
Executive” because an agency “acquires its legitimacy from a
delegation of lawmaking power from Congress.” 219 The danger of
leaving the fox in charge of the henhouse is the accumulation of all
powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary in the same hands of the
Executive, which may lead to “tyranny.” 220 With the rapid growth
and expansion of the modern administrative state, it is foreseeable
that abuse of power can happen more frequently where courts are
required to defer to an agency’s determination of its own scope of
jurisdiction.
The rather optimistic picture that the majority depicted and
the relatively pessimistic picture that the dissent depicted regarding
the political effects of agencies’ rule-making power should be placed
side-by-side and viewed as a whole picture. It is not entirely true that
215

See id. at 1868–69.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer did not share this optimistic view.
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the distinction between “jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional”
questions is meaningless and merely “a mirage.” 221 Rather, it
depends heavily on where the line is drawn and how the question is
presented. As the dissent stated, drawing a line between “big,
important” interpretations and “humdrum, run-of-the-mill” ones may
well be difficult. Yet “[d]istinguishing between whether an agency’s
interpretation of an ambiguous term is reasonable and whether that
term is for the agency to interpret is not nearly so difficult.” 222 In the
City of Arlington case, for instance, neither the FCC nor the Fifth
Circuit was confused about the “jurisdiction” question in their rulings
and identified the issue correctly; that is, they were asked to decide
whether the FCC possessed statutory authority to interpret Section
332(c)(7)(B)(ii) within its scope of power as delegated by
Congress. 223
On the other hand, the danger of confusion exists where the
“application of a broad statutory term can be reframed as a
questionable extension of the agency’s jurisdiction” 224 as the line
between jurisdictional and nonjurisdictional questions is not always
clear. 225 On top of that, it is skeptical that the underpinnings of
Chevron themselves are sufficient to limit an agency’s power when it
comes to the agency’s determination of its own scope of authority,
although one scholar has argued that “the considerations that underlie
Chevron support its application to jurisdictional questions.” 226 As
deeply rooted in the Court’s jurisprudence and this country’s

221
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constitutional structure, unlimited and unchecked powers are
dangerous, and could bring corruption and tyranny.
Under the Chevron framework, if Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue and its intent is clear, “that is
the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 227 The
notion that Congress must speak with clarity is closely associated
with the nondelegation doctrine, where it is widely held that Article I
of the Constitution mandates Congress not to “delegate” its power to
anyone else, and open-ended grants of authority are
unconstitutional. 228 “It is tempting to object to Chevron on
nondelegation grounds, because the decision grants the executive the
authority to interpret the very statutes that limit its power.” 229 Yet
because the executive is politically more accountable than the
judiciary, “an allocation of policymaking authority to executive”
actually “seems to reduce the nondelegation concern.”230
To guard against the abuse of power by agencies on
“jurisdictional” questions, Harvard Law Professor Cass R. Sunstein
proposed that “the principal qualification has to do with certain
sensitive issues, most importantly those involving constitutional
rights. When such matters are involved, Congress should be required
to speak unambiguously; executive interpretation of statutory
ambiguities is not sufficient.” 231 This seems to be a workable
solution to ensure proper power allocation among the executive, the
judiciary, and the legislative, but actually, its effectiveness depends
heavily upon the premise that Congress speaks with clarity and
leaves no “gaps” for agencies to fill when dealing with those
sensitive constitutional issues. The reality, however, is that Congress
often speaks with ambiguity either intentionally or inadvertently.
Therefore, with the majority’s ruling that Chevron deference applies
equally to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions, the visible impact is
that agencies now possess a higher degree of discretion in rulemaking and interpreting statutory ambiguities, which can be a
227
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blessing if its powers are used appropriately, or a disaster if used
inappropriately.
B. Power Balancing Between the Executive and the Judicial
Branches
When the Chevron two-step inquiry was first established, the
Court applied the framework with inconsistency and did not
immediately recognize its revolutionary nature or landmark status.232
One scholar noted, however, “The doctrine quickly gained currency
on . . . the D.C. Circuit, particularly among Reagan appointees like
then-judges Antonin Scalia . . . who recognized it as a ‘landmark’ . . .
for deregulation.” 233 Under Chevron deference, courts could no
longer impose artificial “obstacles” “when an agency that has been a
classic regulator decides to go in the other direction” or when it
“simply sits on its hands and does not choose to do additional things
that could be done.”234
Since his elevation to the Supreme Court in 1986, Justice
Scalia has been a staunch defender of and advocate for the Chevron
framework. For instance, in Immigration and Naturalization Service
v. Cardoza-Fonseca,235 Justice Scalia drafted a concurring opinion in
which he criticized the Court’s analysis of the question regarding
whether the INS’s interpretation of “well-founded fear” was entitled
to deference. 236 Following the Chevron two-step analysis closely and
strictly, Justice Scalia stated, “Since the Court quite rightly concludes
that the INS’s interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain
meaning of that phrase and the structure of the Act . . . there is simply
no need and thus no justification for a discussion of whether the
interpretation is entitled to deference.” 237 Furthermore, as to the
Court’s implication that “courts may substitute their interpretation of
a statute for that of an agency whenever they face ‘a pure question of
232
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statutory construction for the courts to decide,’” Justice Scalia made
a fiery response, declaring that “[n]o support is adduced for this
proposition.”238
Similarly, in Mead, Justice Scalia defended Chevron’s twostep analysis in his dissenting opinion, where the majority of the
Court held that a “gap” alone was not enough to grant deference to an
agency’s interpretation and a variety of factors must be considered in
deciding whether Congress has granted interpreting authority to the
agency. 239 Rejecting the Court’s holding that the agency’s
interpretation qualified for Skidmore deference even when it fell
short of Chevron deference, Justice Scalia remarked:
[I]n an era when federal statutory law administered by
federal agencies is pervasive, and when the
ambiguities (intended or unintended) that those
statutes contain are innumerable, totality-of-thecircumstances Skidmore deference is a recipe for
uncertainty, unpredictability, and endless litigation.
To condemn a vast body of agency action to that
regime (all except rulemaking, formal (and informal?)
adjudication, and whatever else might now and then
be included within today's intentionally vague
formulation of affirmative congressional intent to
“delegate”) is irresponsible. 240
Therefore, it is not surprising that one commentator announced that
City of Arlington was Justice Scalia’s triumph, where a broad rule of
judicial deference was adopted and the multi-factor inquiry relating
to the application of the Skidmore framework was replaced by “a
simple and easily administrable rule of deference to agencies that
reasonably and authoritatively interpret ambiguities in the statutes
that they administer.”241
In City of Arlington, Justice Scalia consistently and constantly
emphasized the importance of the clarity, certainty, and stability of
the Chevron doctrine.
Calling the distinction between
“jurisdictional” and “nonjurisdictional” interpretations a “mirage,”
238
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Justice Scalia stated that, if required to make such a distinction, lower
court judges would be wasting their time in doing “mental
acrobatics” in order to figure out whether an agency’s interpretation
of a statutory ambiguity is “jurisdictional” or “nonjurisdictional.”242
In addition, Justice Scalia also used harsh words in his
response to the dissenting opinion, suggesting that Chevron itself was
the ultimate target.243 The real concern that Justice Scalia had was
about the stability of the Chevron doctrine, which would be
“destroyed” if “Chevron Step Zero” jurisdictional questions are now
subject to courts’ de novo review, as proposed by the dissent. Justice
Scalia warned that thirteen courts of appeals, in applying a totalityof-the-circumstances test, “would render the binding effect of agency
rules unpredictable and destroy the whole stabilizing purpose of
Chevron.”244
In defending the stability of Chevron deference in City of
Arlington, it was Justice Scalia’s belief that the executive, with its
comparative expertise and political accountability, is in a better
position than the judicial branch in making policy judgments, on
which the interpretations of statutory ambiguities often depend. The
establishment of Chevron deference about two decades ago has made
a real impact on the executive’s actions in rule- and policy-making.
For instance, E. Donald Elliott, a former General Counsel of the
EPA, accounted that “Chevron opened up and validated a policymaking dialogue within agencies about what interpretation the
agency should adopt for policy reasons, rather than what
interpretation the agency must adopt for legal reasons.”245 Although
“the political commitments of reviewing judges continue to play a
significant role in the decision whether to uphold interpretations by
the executive branch,” 246 the upholding of the applicability of
Chevron deference to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions in City of
Arlington would probably further reduce such attempts by the
judicial branch in claiming its superior position in interpreting
statutory laws.
242
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In terms of efficiency and predictability of the law, the
majority’s ruling, compared to the dissent’s approach, should be
credited with the merit of providing a clear and uniform standard for
lower courts to follow in determining the applicability of Chevron
deference within different contexts. The reviewing court needs not to
spend time and judicial resources to distinguish “jurisdictional”
interpretations from “nonjurisdictional” interpretations, which, as
discussed earlier, could be a daunting task under certain
circumstances. As George Mason University Law Professor Michael
S. Greve illustrated, D.C. Circuit Judge David S. Tatel “is . . . smart
and clever, and he decides more AdLaw cases in a month than the
Supremes will see in a decade. You don’t want to arm him.” 247
Moreover, because of the clarity of the law, it becomes easier for
parties to predict the results of their legal disputes, and thus it would
discourage litigation and give them the incentive to reach a
settlement.
Finally, City of Arlington’s long-term impact on the actions of
the judicial branch has also been an interesting debating point. One
commentator noted:
So long as administrative agencies’ activity generally
falls short of the full extent of their regulatory
authority—as it surely must, by a large margin, given
Congress’s preference for capacious delegations and
“moods”—Chevron at least stands as an obstacle to
judicial decisions that push the agencies to undertake
new missions that they would otherwise lack the
political capital to carry out.248
Thus it is likely that courts, instead of overturning the policy
decisions made by the executive branch, would now turn to Congress
and require that it speak with clarity so that there are no “gaps” for
the agencies to fill. In addition, the judicial branch is aware that
there is certainly a real danger, as strongly voiced by the dissent, that
the administrative agencies might abuse their powers because of the
expansion of Chevron deference to the “Step Zero” jurisdictional
247
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questions. One solution for the judicial branch to guard against such
a danger is that the reviewing court would be required to undertake
the hard work of statutory construction to hold an agency strictly to
the Chevron standard where the agency must stay within the bounds
of its statutory authority.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Justice Scalia, a member of the Supreme Court’s conservative
bloc, authored the majority opinion in City of Arlington, which was
supported and joined by three of the four “liberals”—Justices
Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. One commentator has made an
interesting observation about this composition of the majority of the
Court, suggesting that “this time around, the Court’s Chevron
coalition may be more durable.”249
Even though Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Roberts did not
see eye to eye in City of Arlington on the issue of Chevron’s
applicability to “Step Zero” jurisdictional questions, it appears that
they still “share the same concern, each struggling for a way to assert
control over an administrative state that does not fit the
Constitution’s separation of powers but is, at this late date, a fact of
life.” 250 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the judicial branch
should perform its duty to police the boundary between the
legislature and the executive, and agencies should not be given any
additional rule-making power to decide “Chevron Step Zero”
questions.
On the other hand, Justice Scalia prefers to defer to agencies,
but he is not necessarily “soft” on them; he can use “the heavy
artillery of thoughtful interpretation to limit the bounds of
permissible agency action.”251 As one commentator observed, “City
of Arlington sends a significant signal to lower court judges that, in
reviewing agency readings of ambiguous statutes, they should remain
in a deferential mood. But judges and justices persuaded that
249
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agencies have gone too far in exercising their powers are not without
leverage to rein them in.”252
City of Arlington holds a special place and commands
considerable importance in the field of administrative law. Professor
Sunstein, the former administrator of the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, has remarked that City of
Arlington is “an important victory” for the Obama administration that
“will long define the relationship between federal agencies and
federal courts.” 253 Another commentator has also noted that the
Court’s ruling in City of Arlington “may mark the most ‘avulsive’
change in administrative law in at least the last 13 years.” 254 The
simple and easily administrable Chevron two-step framework now
applies to an agency’s interpretation of its own scope of jurisdiction
when there is statutory ambiguity. It is foreseeable that this decision
would further shape the operation of a modern administrative state
and this country’s constitutional structure.
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